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I examine the historical development of the concept “temperature” from the point of view of
questions about the stability of concepts during episodes of theory change. It is argued that the
concept retains its identity and meaning through two quite radical developments in surrounding
theory, even while these developments uncover novel fundamental characteristics of “temperature”
and allow new associated definitions for the concept. I then indicate some of the differing underlying
philosophical views which have caused others to view this kind of case very differently, and finally
suggest a number of features that I think a theory of concepts would need to possess in order to
account for the important aspects of the presented case-study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Starting in the early 1960s, Thomas Kuhn and Paul
Feyerabend challenged the traditional cumulativist view
of science, and instead emphasized what Kuhn famously
dubbed “paradigm shifts” – “those non-cumulative devel-
opmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced
in whole or in part by an incompatible new one.” [1, p.
92, emphasis added] Feyerabend in particular stressed
the changes associated specifically with concepts during
such episodes. He attacked the idea that concepts re-
tain their meaning when changes in surrounding theory
lead them, for example, to be redefined: “the postulate
of meaning invariance” as he called this view “is incom-
patible with actual scientific practice.” [2, p. 81]
As pointed out by Dudley Shapere [3] and many oth-
ers since, Feyerabend’s argument rests on a very partic-
ular and indeed somewhat peculiar view of the mean-
ing of concepts. Those who endorse different theories
of concepts have instead seen “meaning invariance” as
not only consistent with, but very much ubiquitous in,
scientific practice. Hilary Putnam, for example, has ar-
gued for the stability of meaning of (among other con-
cepts) “gold” across episodes of theoretical development
[4]; John Norton and Jonathan Bain, and also separately
Theo Arabatzis, have seen referential stability for the
concept “electron” even as physicists’ understanding of
electrons has grown significantly in complexity [5, 6]; and
James Lennox has described the interesting case of the re-
classification of “barnacle” (as a crustacean rather than
a mollusk). [7]
Here I will present a related case-study of the concept
“temperature” – its formation and subsequent develop-
ment through not one but two major advances in sur-
rounding physical theory. One goal is simply to lay out
an additional example of an important scientific concept
for which the Kuhn/Feyerabend perspective is prima fa-
cie implausible, and thus to marginally strengthen the
case for the traditional – and, I think, proper – cumula-
tivist view of scientific development.
A deeper goal, though, is to shed light on certain is-
sues pertaining to the theory of concepts: how they are
formed, what they mean, and what the relationship is
between a concept and its definition. As we will see,
there are several unique features of the development of
the “temperature” concept which allow some discussion
in these directions. It is also hoped that this case-study
and the subsequent philosophical discussion might help
establish the centrality of these issues – pertaining specif-
ically to concepts and their role in science – to the broader
questions, such as science’s cumulativity, that are of in-
terest to philosophers of science.
Like Lennox’s earlier paper on the concept “barnacle”,
I will be motivated in part by the theory of concepts
put forward by philosopher Ayn Rand. [8] Since I won’t
explicitly use – or presuppose any familiarity with – her
account of concepts, there is no need here to discuss her
views in any detail. (The interested reader is referred
to References [7–9].) I will simply here indicate some
general themes of her approach by way of providing an
overall orientation to the case-study to follow.
First, for Rand, it is important that concepts have a
hierarchical structure: while some (e.g., “table”, “bird”,
“tree”) can be formed directly and exclusively on the ba-
sis of perception, others are higher-level in the sense that
their formation involves – and so requires – previously-
formed concepts and/or conceptual knowledge. As we
will see, “temperature” is on this account most certainly
a higher-level concept, and the non-trivial character of
the knowledge required to form the concept, will play an
important role in the subsequent discussion.
Second, it is important on Rand’s view that concepts
are open-ended in two senses: (1) they are intended to
subsume not just the specific objects on the basis of which
they were formed, but an open-ended class of essentially
similar objects, and (2) a concept is understood to mean
its referents, including all of their characteristics both
known and to-be-discovered. As we will see, the devel-
opment of the concept “temperature” will exhibit both
senses of open-endedness.
And third, it is important for Rand’s account of con-
2cepts that essences are epistemological (not metaphys-
ical) – and, relatedly, that definitions (which ought to
state the essence of the concept being defined) do not
stipulate or exhaust a concept’s meaning, but instead
provide a kind of executive summary whose propriety is
relative to some particular context of knowledge. As we
will see, this – together with the previous point – pro-
vides a very natural framework for understanding how
“meaning invariance” can be consistent with the need
to revise a concept’s definition in light of new scientific
discoveries.
Even the explicitly philosophical discussion after the
case-study, however, will not focus on Rand’s views per
se. Instead, the purpose will be to understand more
deeply why people like Kuhn and Feyerabend see a failure
of “meaning invariance” and, more generally, a continual
sequence of revolutionary paradigm shifts – where cumu-
lativists (like me) instead see the systematic expansion
of genuine knowledge. And on the other side, I will point
to a certain feature of the “temperature” case-study to
bring out what I think is a shortcoming in (especially)
Putnam’s earlier defense of meaning invariance. More
generally, this discussion will lead up to a listing of sev-
eral features that I think a theory of concepts needs to
possess in order to account for the various relevant as-
pects of the “temperature” case-study.
II. PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE
CONCEPT “TEMPERATURE”
In Section III, I will recapitulate the historical develop-
ment of the “temperature” concept, with an emphasis on
the original formation of the concept, the major theoreti-
cal advances in understanding the meaning of “tempera-
ture” and (relatedly) the several ways that the concept is
redefined as the surrounding body of theoretical knowl-
edge expands.
Before launching into the history, however, it will be
useful to make some preliminary remarks about what,
precisely, I take the concept of “temperature” to be, and
also about what will be systematically de-emphasized in
my account.
A. Identity of “Temperature”
First, what precisely is the concept of “temperature”?
Commentators very frequently begin their explication of
this concept by discussing the related concepts of “hot”
and “cold” and asserting that “temperature” names the
scale or axis along which objects can be ordered by the
degree to which they are hot or cold. On page 2 of his
treatise on the Theory of Heat, for example, James Clerk
Maxwell asserts that temperature “is a quantity which
indicates how hot or how cold the body is.” [10] The
author of a classic history of the thermometer similarly
declares that temperature “is fundamentally a quantifi-
cation of the sensations ‘hot’ and ‘cold’...” [11, p. 48]
And no doubt on similar grounds, the author of an ex-
cellent contemporary thermometry text asserts (on page
1) that: “The concept of temperature must have origi-
nated during the earliest stages of human development.”
[12]
It is certainly true that the concepts “hot” and “cold”
must have originated during the earliest stages of human
development (just as they are among the first attribute
concepts formed by every toddler). For example, they
played a famously central role already in the physical
theories of the first, pre-Socratic philosophers – not to
mention Aristotle.
And while it is not exactly wrong to say that “temper-
ature” indicates how hot or how cold a body feels, it is
at least rather imprecise: how hot or how cold an object
feels, though in some sense primarily a function of the ob-
ject’s temperature, turns out to depend also on several
other factors including the object’s texture, size, thermal
conductivity, and also on physical properties of the per-
ceiving subject such as the precise degree of warmth of
his own body.
As a textbook example of the alleged untrustworthi-
ness of the senses, the phenomenon of a single sample
of lukewarm water feeling simultaneously cold and hot
(to hands previously immersed in hot and cold water, re-
spectively) is perhaps second only to the straight stick in
water that allegedly looks bent. But, really, the exam-
ple establishes not that the senses deceive us, but simply
that the “degree of perceived warmth” of a body is not
the same thing as its “temperature”.1
Other examples which support the need for this dis-
tinction include the fact that, if you put your hand out-
side the window of a moving car on a hot day, it will feel
cooler (even though, let us say, the temperature of the
air inside and out is the same) – and the fact that, say,
a block of metal and a block of wood (both left outside
on a winter night) won’t feel equally cold to the touch
in the morning, even though their temperatures are the
same.
The upshot is that the concept “temperature” – as dis-
1 For an example of the consequences of failing to make this dis-
tinction – i.e., of regarding “temperature” as simply a quantifica-
tion of “degree of perceivable warmth” see Ref. [13], pp. 42-43,
where Chang raises the apparently-tricky issue of how it can be
that our trust in the reliability of thermoscopes rests on their
agreement with sensations of hot and cold, even though “we also
allow instruments to augment and even correct sensation.” (Em-
phasis added.) Note in particular that, because he doesn’t clearly
distinguish “degree of perceivable warmth” from “temperature”
(as I am suggesting here that one should), Chang sees the need
for correction of something that was mistaken/invalid. But on
my view, it was never that the sensations of hot and cold were
mistaken and in need of correction. It is rather that what the
thermoscope measures – namely “temperature” – is just one of
several factors which jointly contribute to the relevant sensations.
The connection to the kinds of issues raised in the Introduction,
involving the cumulativity of science, should be obvious.
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tively sophisticated and technical concept, naming one of
the several factors on which degrees of perceived warmth
depend.
It is, I think, helpful here to analogize “temperature”
to the concept which plays a very similar role for vi-
sual/color attributes: “hue”. Concepts like “red” and
“blue” are constructible from direct sense perception just
as are “hot” and “cold”. And it does not take too much
additional sophistication to form a genus concept like
“color”. But “hue” – though closely related to the con-
cept of “color” and the associated idea of a “color spec-
trum”, is actually quite sophisticated: it denotes one of
the several respects in which colors can vary from one an-
other (the others being “saturation” and “brightness”),
and so presupposes some method of isolating this one
respect.
The quite interesting element of disanalogy here is
that, even at the purely perceptual level, colors are ex-
perienced as varying along several linearly independent
axes. For example, whereas royal blue seems bluer than
turquoise, robin’s egg blue is (say) just as blue as royal
blue – meaning they have the same hue – only it is whiter
or softer. But one has no trouble perceptually discrim-
inating turquoise from robin’s egg blue: they just don’t
look the same. By contrast, two bodies which differ from
some standard body along two of the distinct dimensions
which contribute to “degree of perceived warmth” – say,
one is significantly colder but with an equal thermal con-
ductivity, and the other is only marginally colder but
with a much greater thermal conductivity – will perhaps
feel equally cool. Thus, while “temperature” is like “hue”
in the sense of naming one very particular respect in
which perceptual experiences of the relevant sort can vary
(such that both concepts are, so to speak, quite distant
from the purely perceptual level), “temperature” is even
more sophisticated than “hue” because its formation will
require not just a fine distinction, but in addition some
kind of experimental apparatus to render the distinction
detectable at all.
It should thus be clear that the isolation of this one par-
ticular causal factor (from the others which contribute) is
going to require the existence and use of a thermometer
(or, for our purposes here equivalently, a thermoscope –
this being the standard term for a thermometer without
a series of marks indicating numbered degrees). Such a
device will allow one, for example, to discover that two
objects can register the same thermal state on the ther-
mometer, even though one feels warmer than the other –
it becoming thus apparent that the difference in “degree
of perceived warmth” is due to some other difference in
the objects. For example, perhaps the two objects are
made of very different materials (e.g., one is wood and
one is metal), perhaps the two objects are made of the
same materials but have very different surface textures
or thicknesses, or perhaps (if fluids) the two objects differ
in the velocity with which they move past one’s hand.
As I will discuss further in the next section, the first
thermometers were created in roughly the first decades
of the 1600s. During the subsequent century or so, we
see people using the newly-invented devices to make pre-
cisely these sorts of observations. For example, in 1615,
Galileo’s friend Sagredo used an early thermometer to
demonstrate that water from wells is actually warmer in
the summer than in the winter – even “though our senses
judge differently” (or so he claims). [11, p. 7] A simi-
lar discovery was that “the air of caves and cellars, is not
warmer in winter, as our senses would lead us to believe.”
[11, p. 37] And again, in 1710, we have the first known re-
port of an experiment showing “that blowing air against
the bulb of a thermometer with a bellows that had been
left with the thermometer for some hours did not change
the reading.” [11, p. 57]
The claim here is that it is precisely through such
exploratory experimentation that the idea of a purely
thermal property of objects, distinct from their mate-
rial nature, size, surface texture, and flow velocity – and
also distinct from the “degree of perceivable warmth” to
which all of these properties jointly contribute – “proves
itself.” [14] Thus, the concept of “temperature” was not
at all “originated during the earliest stages of human de-
velopment.” Rather, it originated only in the period fol-
lowing the invention of the first crude thermometers in
the early 1600s, as these devices (and so the physical at-
tribute they measured) proved themselves useful in prac-
tical sciences such as medicine and meteorology.
Of course, this raises a kind of chicken-and-egg prob-
lem: what is a “thermometer” if not a device used to mea-
sure temperature? And so, wouldn’t one have to already
possess the concept “temperature” in order to build a
thermometer (or recognize some device as a thermome-
ter) – in order to then isolate and conceptualize “tem-
perature” in the way that I’ve sketched here? Looking
at the actual history points the way out of this dilemma.
The first, crude thermometers were thought of as devices
for registering and quantifying (not “temperature”, but
rather) “degree of perceivable warmth”. And this caused
no trouble so long as the devices were only used in cases
where the other relevant causal factors (beyond “temper-
ature”) contributing to “warmth” were held fixed: for ex-
ample, to compare the degrees of warmth of two glasses
of water, or of the breaths of two medical patients. The
claim is, then, that it is precisely in and by confronting
the puzzles which arose in the subsequent decades – when
these devices began to be used to make more sophis-
ticated comparisons in which their readings seemed to
conflict with sensations of warmth – that the concept
“temperature” was created – at which point the devices
were recognized to register temperature as opposed to
“degree of perceivable warmth”.
It is perhaps also worth noting here that the first
known usage of the word “temperature” – in the sense
4relevant here2 – occurs in 1626 [11, p. 20], and also that
another crucial differentiation which is probably required
for the genuine formation of the concept “temperature”
– namely, the distinction between “temperature” and
“heat” – was also being worked out during this same time
period, with Francis Bacon in 1620 marking roughly the
beginning, and Joseph Black in the middle 1700s marking
the conclusion, of this line of development. (For further
discussion see, for example, Ref. [15].)
Finally, having begun this discussion by suggest-
ing that other commentators typically identify (what
I am calling) “temperature” and “degree of perceived
warmth,” I should clarify that in fact my insistence on
distinguishing these is not so unusual. That is, other
commentators typically only begin by noting the relation
of “temperature” to perceptible degrees of warmth, with
caveats and clarifications similar to my own following in
due course. Maxwell, for example, very quickly notes:
“We might suppose that a person who has
carefully cultivated his senses would be able
by simply touching an object to assign its
place in a scale of temperatures, but it
is found by experiment that the estimate
formed of temperature by the touch depends
upon a great variety of circumstances, some
of these relating to the texture or consistency
of the object, and some to the temperature of
the hand or the state of health of the person
who makes the estimate.” [10, p. 2]
He then clarifies that by the use “of the word temperature
we fix in our minds the conviction that it is possible, not
only to feel, but to measure, how hot a body is.” [10, p.
2, emphasis added]
Given that our goal here is not to present the content
of thermodynamics or thermometry – but rather to care-
fully trace the historical development of the concept of
“temperature” – it was important to stress not the con-
tinuity of “temperature” with more basic concepts such
as “hot” and “cold” (though it is clearly in some senses
built on them), but instead to stress its distinctness from
these earlier concepts.
2 An earlier sense of the word was related to the current English
word “temperate” and indicated a balance or mixing of opposite
elements. In the mid- to late-1500s, one sees this word being
used increasingly to denote specifically the balance or mixing of
hot and cold, in the Aristotelian sense of opposite elementary
qualities. It was therefore natural to use this word for the novel
concept that, I’m arguing, came into existence shortly thereafter.
Note also that one sometimes sees the word “temperature” in
English translations of Greek texts, such as some of Aristotle’s
biological writings. This, however, seems always to be a conden-
sation of what was, in the original Greek, an extended phrase
(such as translating, as “change in temperature”, something lit-
erally rendered as “change with respect to hot and cold”) or a
substitution for the ambiguous Greek meaning “heat” or “the
hot”. Thanks to Allan Gotthelf, p.c., for help with the transla-
tions.
B. Temperature: concept vs. measurement scale
As a second piece of preliminary ground-clearing, it
will help also to say what will not be emphasized in the
historical sketch to follow. I restrict my attention almost
exclusively to the concept of “temperature” – not to the
various developing (and competing) experimental meth-
ods and scales for its measurement.
That is to say, I intend to (almost) completely gloss
over the controversies about such things as: which ther-
mometric fluid (water or mercury or alcohol or air or
some other) yields the best-functioning thermometers;
whether air- (or some other gas-) based thermometers are
generally preferable to those using liquids; which (and
how many) fixed points should be used for calibration
and how their fixity can be established; how to estab-
lish an “absolute” temperature scale that doesn’t rest on
the arbitrary selection of some particular thermometric
substance; and so on.
It’s not that these issues are uninteresting or unimpor-
tant – just that they are irrelevant to my project. Of
course, saying this reveals some things about my philo-
sophic views. For example, I’m not an operationalist,
so I don’t regard the procedures for measuring temper-
ature as constitutive of the meaning of the concept. In-
deed, just the opposite: I think it’s clear that the quest
to systematically improve the procedures for measuring
temperatures (by making the measurements more pre-
cise, by finding ways to extend the range of tempera-
tures which can be meaningfully measured, by finding
less arbitrary temperature scales, etc.) presupposes the
possession of an already-meaningful, robust concept of
“temperature”. Those interested in a more operational-
ist approach in which this quest takes center stage, are
referred to Hasok Chang’s recent book Inventing Tem-
perature. [13] (References [12] and [16] provide excel-
lent, though non-philosophical, overviews of contempo-
rary thermometry from the point of view of the practical
physicist or engineer, and Ref. [17] gives a very accessi-
ble historical account of these issues through the middle
of the 19th century.)
What kind of advance, then, do I regard as pertaining
to the actual concept of “temperature” – and so being rel-
evant to the project here? That will be the story of the
next section. But for now I’ll just indicate that I recog-
nize two fundamental advances beyond the “thermomet-
ric stage” in which the concept first arises. The first is
the adoption of the kinetic theory of heat (and the related
kinetic theory of gases). This permitted a new defini-
tion of “temperature” purely in terms of independently-
established intrinsic physical properties. The second is
Boltzmann’s discovery of the microscopic meaning of “en-
tropy”; this permitted a further re-definition of “temper-
ature” which had the virtue of explaining the previous
one(s) and also permitting the application of the con-
cept to new domains (where the kinetic theory notion
was simply inapplicable).
5III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CONCEPT “TEMPERATURE”
Let me then begin my sketch of the historical origins
and subsequent development of this concept.
A. The Thermometric Stage
The Greek physician Galen applied the traditional
(Empedoclean/Aristotelian) notion of four elements to
people, classifying them according to “temperament”,
i.e., the degrees of such opposing qualities as “hot” and
“cold” which allegedly constituted their natures. [18]
Galen may have been the first to design a numerical scale
along which degrees of hot and cold could be placed – but,
not possessing a thermometer, his measurements were re-
stricted to unaided sense perception, and hence (I would
say) constituted rudimentary measurements not of “tem-
perature” but only of “warmth.”
Devices which do indeed register temperature were also
known in Ancient Greece, though (it seems) these were
considered mere novelties (being conceived, for example,
simply as demonstrations that the sun’s heat could be
made to move water) and were never actually used to
measure temperature. The first century (AD) Pneumat-
ica by Heron of Alexandria, for example, discusses a num-
ber of devices in which water is moved by the application
of heat or cold to a bit of trapped air. This work was
translated into Latin in the mid-late 16th century, and
the construction of the first actual thermometers was ev-
idently motivated by the recognition that the devices in
Hero’s text could be used for this purpose. [11, 18]
The question of who should be credited with the in-
vention of the thermometer is a question of some contro-
versy. The first published account is in a 1611 work of
the Italian physiologist Santorio Santorii:
“I must inform you of a marvellous method,
by which, with the aid of a glass instrument,
I am wont to measure the cold or hot tem-
perature of the air, of all districts, all places,
and all parts of the body, and so exactly that
at any time of the day I can measure with
the compass the degrees and ultimate stations
of heat and cold; and it is in our house at
Padua and we show it freely to all; we promise
shortly to bring out a book on medical in-
struments in which we shall give the figure,
construction and uses of this very ancient in-
strument.” [18]
Santorio later explained that the device consisted of an
air-filled glass bulb with a long neck, and says that it was
adapted from a device “put forward by Heron for another
purpose.” [18] (It is possible, however, that Santorio in-
vented the device independently, and only credited Heron
later when it was pointed out to him that a similar device
had been discussed in the Pneumatica. [11])
There exists also a letter written in 1638 by a friend of
Galileo, which attributes the invention to him:
“I remember an experiment shown to me,
about thirty-five years ago, by our Signor
Galileo. He took a glass flask about the size
of a small hen’s egg, with a neck about two
palmi in length and as narrow as a wheat-
straw, and having well warmed the said flask
in his hands, he then turned the opening up-
side down into a vessel placed underneath,
which contained a little water. When he took
away the heat of his hands from the flask,
the water at once began to rise in the neck
and mounted higher, by more than a palmo,
than the level of the water in the vessel. Sig.
Galileo made use of this effect to construct an
instrument for examining the degrees of heat
and cold.” [18]
Galileo seems to have claimed the invention of the ther-
mometer for himself in letters from about 1612, and there
is some evidence that he may have presented a demon-
stration thermoscope to students as early as the 1590s,
but no account appears in any of his surviving writings
of this period.
There are several others from this same period for
whom some case for the invention of the thermometer can
be made; most probably more than one instance of ge-
niunely independent creation occured. [18] For our pur-
poses, though, these issues are irrelevant; what matters
is just that, in the first decades of the 17th century, it
became widely recognized that one could use the thermal
expansion and contraction of air to measure variations in
perceptible hot and cold along the particular axis that
came eventually to be conceptualized as “temperature”.
In the subsequent decades and centuries, many signif-
icant advances in thermometry occured. These include
the increasing use of closed devices using the thermal ex-
pansion of a liquid (such as water, alcohol, or mercury)
instead of air to register the temperature, and also an
increasing thoughtfulness and sophistication in regard to
the question of numerical scale and its calibration. Such
advances are nicely reviewed from a historical point of
view in References [11] and [17], from the pratical point
of view of the contemporary physicist or engineer in Ref.
[12] and [16], and from a philosophical point of view in
Ref. [13].
From the point of view of this paper, however, such ad-
vances pertain essentially to issues of standardization, re-
producibility, and communicability, and do not represent
any fundamental change in the way that “temperature”
is conceived.
One contemporary physics text, after briefly sketch-
ing the state of thermal knowledge up to the mid-19th
century, notes that: “So far, all we have really done in
defining temperature is to make the somewhat circular
statement that ‘temperature is what one measures with
a thermometer’.” [19, p. 413] This, of course, is a bit
6tongue-in-cheek. A proper definition would provide a
sensible genus such as “physical property” and would
need (in order to avoid the noted circularity) to flesh out
what was already known about how a thermometer func-
tions: first, certain materials expand/contract as they
are heated/cooled, such that their volumes can be taken
to indicate or register their own temperatures; second,
heat will flow spontaneously between objects in thermal
contact – always from the hotter (higher temperature)
body to the cooler (lower temperature) body – until a
state of thermal equilibrium (equality of temperatures)
is achieved; and so, third, a thermometer (placed in ther-
mal contact with another body for a long time) can be
understood to register also the temperature of that body.
The contemporary Oxford English Dictionary provides
a more serious “thermometric stage” definition of “tem-
perature” which at least indicates all of these ideas: “The
state of a substance or body with regard to sensible
warmth or coldness, referred to some standard of com-
parison; spec. that quality or condition of a body which
in degree varies directly with the amount of heat con-
tained in the body, and inversely with its heat-capacity;
commonly manifested by its imparting heat to, or receiv-
ing it from, contiguous bodies, and usually measured by
means of a thermometer or similar instrument.” [20]
B. The Kinetic Stage
Although the assignment of a specific temperature
value to an object requires a physical interaction between
it and a thermometer, temperature is – from the very be-
ginning, and quite properly – conceived as a property of
the object and not merely of the object-device interac-
tion.
That is, the thermometer (under appropriate condi-
tions) is understood as registering the pre-existing tem-
perature of the object. Thus, the question immediately
arises: what sort of intrinsic physical property (or prop-
erties) of the object does “temperature” actually refer
to? That is, what, precisely, is the physical difference
between two bodies which differ only in temperature?
One possible answer is as obviously correct as it is use-
less: temperature denotes the “intensity” or “density”
of heat contained in the body. Such an answer simply
moves the question back without really answering it. We
want then to know precisely how a body changes physi-
cally when (say) some quantity of heat flows into it. The
point is just that the well-known theoretical controversies
during especially the 18th and 19th centuries about the
physical nature of heat can be equivalently thought of
as controversies about the underlying, specifically micro-
physical meaning of temperature.
The widespread view during the first part of this pe-
riod was the fluid or “caloric” theory of heat, according to
which heat was identified with a subtle, elastic fluid (the
“caloric”, typically thought to consist of particularly fine
particles) – temperature then being a measure of what
amounts to the density of this fluid (or at least the part of
the fluid which was, in a given body at a given time, “sen-
sible” rather than “latent”). It is well-known, of course,
that this theory was eventually abandoned, though it is
worth stressing that the caloric theory was by no means
irrational or ridiculous: it accounted in a very plausible
way for many of the empirical principles of heat flow, and
could be integrated with some apparent fruitfulness with
other ideas such as Dalton’s early chemical atomic theory
to account for certain qualitative aspects of the behavior
of gases.
Despite its plausibilty and reasonableness as a candi-
date theory, though, the caloric theory was regard with a
certain cautious tentativeness by all but its most narrow-
minded proponents. An 1820 Dictionary of Chemistry,
for example, contains the following entry:
“CALORIC. The agent to which the phe-
nomena of heat and combustion are ascribed.
This is hypothetically regarded as a fluid,
of inappreciable tenuity, whose particles are
endowed with indefinite ido-repulsive pow-
ers, and which, by their distribution in vari-
ous proportions among the particles of pon-
derable matter, modify cohesive attraction,
giving birth to the three general forms of
gaseous, liquid, and solid.” (emphasis added)
[21]
Note that this defines “caloric” as whatever lies behind
the phenomena of heat, with what is now normally re-
ferred to as the “caloric theory of heat” being just one
hypothesis about its nature. As Maxwell would later ex-
plain, though, the word eventually came to connote so
strongly the hypothesis of an imponderable fluid, that it
could no longer be used in this neutral, non-committal
sense. [10]
The dictionary entry seems to accurately reflect the
attitudes of the scientists of the period, who indeed gen-
erally considered the controversy between the caloric the-
ory and its (main) rival – the kinetic theory of heat – to
be unsettled. For example, Joseph Black explains in his
mid-18th century lectures:
“Heat is plainly something extraneous to
matter. It is either something superadded
to ordinary matter or some alteration of it
from its most spontaneous state. Having ar-
rived at this conclusion, it may perhaps be
required of me, in the next place, to express
more distinctly this something – to give a full
description, or definition, of what I mean by
the word heat in matter. This, however, is a
demand that I cannot satisfy entirely. I shall
mention, by and by, the supposition relating
to this subject that appears to me the most
probable. But our knowledge of heat is not
brought to that state of perfection that might
enable us to propose with confidence a theory
of heat or to assign an immediate cause for it.
7“Some ingenious attempts have been made
in this part of our subject, but none of them
has been sufficient to explain the whole of it.
However, this should not give us much un-
easiness. It is not the immediate manner of
acting, dependent on the ultimate nature of
this peculiar substance, or this particular con-
dition of common matter, that most interests
us. We are far removed as yet from that ex-
tent of chemical knowledge which makes this
a necessary step for further improvement. We
have still before us an abundant field of re-
search in the various general facts and laws
of action, which constitute the real objects
of pure chemical science. And I apprehend
that it is only when we have nearly com-
pleted this catalogue that we shall have a suf-
ficient number of resembling facts to lead us
to a clear knowledge of the behavior peculiar
to this substance or modification of matter
called heat...” [15, p 150-1]
After reviewing the then-current evidence in favor of both
the kinetic and caloric theories of heat, Black concludes:
“neither of these suppositions has been fully and accu-
rately considered by their authors, or applied to explain
the whole of the facts and phenomena relating to heat.
They have not, therefore, supplied us with a proper the-
ory or explication of the nature of heat.” [15, p. 152]
Similarly, Lavoisier and Laplace declare in 1780:
“We will not decide at all between the two
foregoing hypotheses. Several phenomena
seem favourable to the [kinetic theory of
heat], such as the heat produced by the fric-
tion of two solid bodies, for example; but
there are others which are explained more
simply by the other – perhaps both hold at
the same time.” (Translated in Ref. [21].)
Sadi Carnot, who in 1824 brilliantly grasped the second
law of thermodynamics a quarter century before the first
law was formulated, based part of his analysis on the con-
servation of heat, regarded as a consequence of the caloric
theory. But even he recognized the less-than-conclusive
character of the evidence for that theory:
“The fundamental law that we propose to
confirm seems to us to require, however, in
order to be placed beyond doubt, new verifi-
cations. It is based upon the theory of heat as
it is understood to-day, and it should be said
that this foundation does not appear to be
of unquestionable solidity. New experiments
alone can decide the question.” [22, pg 107]
(See also the discussion in Ref. [21].)
The positive evidence supporting the rival kinetic the-
ory of heat was building up during this same period.
Already in 1620, Francis Bacon had suggested, on the
grounds that new heat comes into existence when an ob-
ject is rubbed or hammered, that “heat itself, its essence
and quiddity, is motion and nothing else.” [15, p. 170]
The same view was expressed often in the 17th and 18th
centuries. Benjamin Thompson (aka Count Rumford)
strengthened the evidence significantly with his care-
ful and systematic experiments showing not only that
a seemingly unlimited amount of heat can be generated
when two objects generate friction by rubbing against
one another, but, crucially, that the thermal properties
of the objects are not changed (as one might have ex-
pected on the basis of the caloric theory). Thompson
summarizes, in his paper of 1798:
“It is hardly necessary to add that anything
which any insulated body, or system of bod-
ies, can continue to furnish without limita-
tion, cannot possibly be a material substance;
and it appears to me to be extremely difficult,
if not quite impossible, to form any distinct
idea of anything capable of being excited and
communicated in the manner in which heat
was excited and communicated in these ex-
periments, except it be MOTION.” [15, pg
187-8]
The case for the kinetic theory of heat became conclu-
sive in roughly the middle of the 19th century, after
Joule’s experiments establishing the value of the “me-
chanical equivalent of heat” and the associated recog-
nition of what is now called the first law of thermody-
namics: energy is conserved when heat (recognized as a
microscopic form of energy) is taken into account.
The so-called kinetic theory of gases – repeatedly de-
veloped and subsequently ignored or forgotten during
this same period – finally became widely accepted at
about the same time. As Rudolf Clausius explained it
in 1857, according to the kinetic theory of gases the
“pressure of the gas against a fixed surface
is caused by the molecules in great number
continually striking against and rebounding
from the same. The force which must thence
arise is, in the first place, by equal velocity of
motion inversely proportional to the volume
of the given quantity of gas; and secondly, by
equal volume proportional to the vis viva [i.e.,
kinetic energy] of the translatory motion: the
other motions do not here immediately come
into consideration.
“On the other hand, from Gay-Lussac’s law
we know that, under constant volume, the
pressure of a perfect gas increases in the same
ratio as the temperature calculated from
−273◦ C., which we call the absolute temper-
ature. Hence ... it follows that the absolute
temperature is proportional to the vis viva of







where the left hand side means the translational ki-
netic energy averaged over the individual molecules, kB
is a universal proportionality constant (eventually to be
known as Boltzmann’s constant), and T is the (absolute)
temperature.
The kinetic model of gases could account not only for
the empirical gas laws of Boyle and Charles but also pre-
dicted what is now known as Avogadro’s hypothesis – for
which, at this same time, there was starting to be strong
independent empirical support.
By the 1860s, several additional pieces of the puz-
zle were falling into place. Clausius had recognized the
possibility of non-translational kinetic energy playing a
role, and used this to account for the differences in spe-
cific heats among different chemical species of gas. And
Maxwell gave a particularly beautiful proof that, averag-
ing over all possible collisions, when two gases (initially
at different temperatures) are allowed to mix, their tem-
peratures (as defined just above) will tend, statistically,
to equalize. [24] And Maxwell would subsequently show
that the kinetic theory could account also for the various
transport phenomena in gases: heat conduction, diffu-
sion, and viscosity.
One thus has at least an in-principle causal expla-
nation for the most important empirical generalizations
that were previously noted as supporting the tempera-
ture concept – for example, that heat flows spontaneously
from hotter to colder objects, and that objects in thermal
contact will eventually achieve the same temperature –
and thus in particular a causal explanation of the func-
tioning of thermometers: the statistical thermal equili-
bration process described by Maxwell results in the aver-
age translational kinetic energies of the molecules of the
object becoming equal to that of the molecules in the
thermometric fluid of the thermometer, and the macro-
scopic volume of that fluid in turn registers the molecular
kinetic energies because faster molecules must spread out
somewhat in space in order to maintain a constant pres-
sure.
In summary, by roughly the 1860s, the kinetic theory
of heat and gases allowed for the identification of a new
essential characteristic of the temperature concept: an
object’s temperature (on a certain now-privileged scale)
was a measure of the average translational kinetic energy
of its constituent molecules.3 By “essential” here, I just
3 In Ref. [13], Chang distinguishes the “ordinal (thermoscope-
based) temperature concept” from the cardinal scale that (he
suggests) is provided by a genuine thermometer (with a well-
defined numerical scale and calibration). (See his pages 41 and
87, for example.) The ordinal/cardinal distinction is indeed im-
portant, and he’s right that a thermoscope provides only an ordi-
nal scale. Unlike Chang, though, I think that in a way the whole
mean to capture the inevitable sense that the kinetic the-
ory seems to have identified what temperature really is.
Hasok Chang, for example, notes that “Practical ther-
mometry achieved a good deal of reliabililty and preci-
sion before people could say with any confidence what
it was that thermometers measured.” [13, p. 160] The
sense, of course, is that “what it was that thermometers
measured” was recognized finally with the kinetic theory
identification of temperature with average translational
kinetic energy. Moreover, this identification brings with
it an explanation of the principles underlying the nature
and function of thermometers.
And this newly identified essential characteristic was
subsequently used in an updated “Definition of Temper-
ature from the Kinetic Standpoint. According to the ki-
netic theory the temperature of a system corresponds to
a certain value of the mean kinetic energy of translation
of the molecules”. [27]
point of all the detailed case histories he re-tells in the book,
can be captured by the following simple claim: the more so-
phisticated temperature measurement techniques and scales still
provide only an ordinal scale for temperature. That is, I think, it
is only with the establishment of the kinetic theory of heat and in
particular the identification of temperature with average trans-
lational molecular kinetic energy, that one has, for the first time,
a genuinely cardinal scale, with respect to which it is genuinely
meaningful to assert, for example, that a given temperature is
twice another. The meaning of such a statement is, of course,
just that the molecules in the one case have, on average, twice the
translational kinetic energy as they do in the other case. Prior
to this kinetic theory identification, any such statement unavoid-
ably involves some element of arbitrary convention. This was
pointed out in 1848 by William Thomson (Lord Kelvin): “Al-
though we have thus a strict principle for constructing a definite
system for the estimation of temperature, yet as reference is es-
sentially made to a specific body as the standard thermometric
substance ... we can only regard, in strictness, the scale actu-
ally adopted as an arbitrary series of numbered points...” [25]
Later, the point was made even more forcefully by Ernst Mach.
[26]. See Section III C for further discussion of Thomson’s al-
legedly less arbitrary, “absolute” (thermodynamic) temperature
scale. Note also that one could imagine perfectly parallel con-
troversies playing themselves out in the history of the concept
“hue” which I earlier analogized to “temperature”. For example,
it would be easy to assign a perfectly definite number to each
distinct hue – say, the number characterizing the angle of refrac-
tion for monochromatic light of that hue. But then: through
a prism made of what material, exactly, and possessing which
precise shape? One thus sees clearly that what might appear as
a cardinal scale for measuring hues (because definite numbers,
which can be compared quantitatively, are used) is in fact really
still just ordinal, the numbers being after all based on an ulti-
mately arbitrary choice of a prism with some particular shape,
material composition, etc. To be clear, I have no idea whether
there ever was such a debate – my point is only that there might
have been, and this sheds some light on what is and isn’t unique
– and what is and isn’t interesting – about the historical contro-
versies recapitulated in Chang’s book.
9C. The Statistical Stage
As mentioned already, in 1824 Sadi Carnot identified
(what would later be called) the second law of thermo-
dynamics. More precisely, Carnot assumed the universal
validity of the familiar fact that heat flows spontaneously
from higher- to lower-temperature objects – but never
vice versa – and established, on the basis of this assump-
tion, an amazing fact about heat engines: the efficiency
of a reversible heat engine operating between two fixed
temperatures (e.g., that of the boiler and that of the
condenser) was a universal function of those two tem-
peratures, independent of the working fluid used in the
engine, or any other particular details of its construction.
(Any element of irreversibility in the engines would only
reduce the efficiency.)
For a reversible heat engine between a condensor of
temperature T and a boiler of temperature T + dT ,
Carnot’s result can be put mathematically as follows:
η = C(T ) dT (2)
where η is the efficiency (defined as the ratio of the use-
ful mechanical work output W to the quantity of heat
absorbed from the boiler Qin) and C(T ) is the “Carnot
function” – the crucial point being that this function is
universal, i.e., independent of the material or mechanical
details of the particular heat engine in question (pro-
vided, of course, that it is reversible).
What particular mathematical function of T C(T ) is,
of course, will depend on which temperature scale one
adopts. If, for example, one assumes a reversible heat
engine using an ideal gas as the working fluid, and pro-
vided one adopts the associated kinetic theory definition






On the other hand, if one adopts (say) the Celsius
scale for temperature, one will have a different (though
of course mathematically equivalent) functional depen-
dence.
As William Thomson (aka Lord Kelvin) famously
pointed out in 1848, the universality of C(T ) allowed it
to be used to define a new (equally universal) tempera-
ture scale, i.e., one in which (unlike all other previously-
proposed scales) no arbitrary “reference is ... made to a
specific body as the standard thermometric substance.”
[25] After initially proposing the simplest possibility –
namely that C(T ) should be a constant, independent
of temperature – he recognized that that scale would
be pointlessly divergent from the already accepted scale
based on the thermal expansion and contraction of gases
(extrapolated to, and then measured from, “absolute
zero”).
In 1854, then, and with some help from Joule, Kelvin
proposed instead adopting Equation (3) as a stipula-
tion for the functional form of C(T ), entailing a uni-
versal thermometric scale that coincided with the “ki-
netic stage” definition of “temperature” – and agreed
very closely with the scale defined by actual gas-based
thermometers. (See pages 173-186 of Ref. [13] for a more
detailed account of the historical development here.)
Note that the way I am telling the story here is perhaps
a little bit confusing, since the kinetic theory of gases
(and the associated kinetic theory definition of tempera-
ture) wasn’t widely adopted until at least about a decade
after Kelvin proposed his universal temperature scale(s).
So his motivation for proposing to adopt Equation (3)
certainly was not that it re-created the definition I gave in
the previous sub-section. It was rather that the adoption
of Equation (3) allowed the “universal” temperature scale
to coincide with what Kelvin (together with Joule) called
“temperature from the zero of the air-thermometer.” [13,
p. 185]
The reason for this bit of anachronism is that, contrary
to most other commentators, I don’t see anything par-
ticularly profound in Kelvin’s idea of a universal temper-
ature scale. At best, it represents an argument for the
privileged status of some particular temperature scale,
but doesn’t seem to add anything to one’s understanding
of what temperature is. And, in a way, it doesn’t even
privilege any particular temperature scale, as Kelvin’s
own oscillations show: one could stipulate any arbitrary
functional form for C(T ) and thereby bless, as “univer-
sal”, any arbitrarily preferred temperature scale. At
the end of the day, then, Kelvin’s proposal seems to
me to be little more than a rather empty nod of sup-
port for the already-well-established gas-based tempera-
ture scale, whose ultimate justification (as somehow truly
privileged) would I think only arise with the kinetic the-
ory as explained in the previous sub-section.
All of this does, nevertheless, play an important role
in our project here. For with Kelvin’s eventual choice
for a universal temperature scale – namely that which
turns out to coincide with the kinetic theory definition of
temperature – it turns out that the ratio of the boiler and
condenser temperatures in a reversible heat engine will
be equal to the ratio of the quantities of heat absorbed








where the quantities of heat flowing in and out are related
to the useful mechanical work output W according to the
first law of thermodynamics (the conservation of energy):
dQin = W + dQout. (5)







It is as if there is some new substance, a certain quantity
of which – namely the left hand side of Equation (6) – is
10
absorbed by the working fluid of the heat engine during
the part of the cycle when it absorbs heat (isothermally)
from the boiler, the same quantity – the right hand side of
Equation (6) – then being transferred into the condenser
during the other part of the cycle, when the working fluid
passes heat into the condenser.
This hypothetical new substance was named entropy
by Clausius, who recognized that – for the same reason
that the caloric theory of heat had been abandoned – it
couldn’t be a literal substance at all, because it wasn’t
conserved. Equation (6), after all, applied only in the
case of reversible heat engines. For an irreversible engine
(i.e., for any real heat engine), the entropy transferred
from the engine to the condensor would be greater than
the entropy transferred from the boiler into the engine
– i.e., the irreversible processes within the engine itself
could create entropy ex nihilo.
Thus, like temperature itself, surely entropy was some
kind of emergent property of the microscopic/molecular
state of the gas. But what kind of property? Clausius
had no idea, and simply defined the entropy S through






– recognizing of course also that entropy could increase
“spontaneously” (i.e., without any associated heat flow)
if there is some irreversibility involved.
It is then possible to reformulate the second law of ther-
modynamics as follows: the entropy of a closed system
can increase or stay the same, but can never decrease.
That is,
dS ≥ 0. (8)
This is a re-formulation of the second law (as opposed
to some new kind of statement) because it can be shown
– rather miraculously – that this statement about the
as-yet mysterious concept of entropy is perfectly equiv-
alent to the two previously-mentioned statements of the
second law: that heat flows spontaneously from hotter
to colder objects (but never vice versa), and that the
efficiency of a reversible heat engine operating between
two fixed temperatures is a universal function of those
temperatures.
What is important for us is that, eventually, the micro-
scopic meaning of entropy was identified. This is sum-
marized in the famous equation of Ludwig Boltzmann
(which, actually was first written in this form not by
Boltzmann but by Max Planck):
S = kB log(g) (9)
where S is the entropy of a system with certain given
macroscopic properties, kB is (again) Boltzmann’s con-
stant, and g is the number of distinct (suitably coarse-
grained) microstates which share the macrosopic proper-
ties of the micro-state to which entropy S is being as-
signed. This isn’t the place to give a detailed explication
of Boltzmann’s account of entropy. Suffice it here to say
that S measures the “specialness” of states: states which
are relatively “unique” (in the sense of there being rel-
atively few other states which are relevantly like them)
will have low entropy, while states which are relatively
“common” (in the sense of there being many other states
which are relevantly like them) will have high entropy.
Importantly, Boltzmann’s account of entropy (unlike an
influential later one due to Gibbs) permits an explana-
tion of how the time-asymmetric behavior captured by
the second law in the form of Equation (8) can emerge
from time-symmetric underlying laws. [28]
We can finally put these pieces together to identify
a new, even more fundamental way to define “tempera-
ture.” With heat and now also entropy being understood
in terms of the micro-physical properties of systems (and,
importantly, being so understood independently of “tem-
perature”), one can mathematically rearrange Equation










We then regard this as a new, purely micro-physical def-
inition of temperature. This formula or its equivalent
is typically asserted as the “fundamental definition of
temperature” in modern statistical mechanics textbooks.
(See, e.g., pages xiii and 41 of Ref. [29].)
All of this was summarized nicely by Max Planck in his
contribution to a 60th birthday festschrift for Boltzmann:
“It seems that Clausius and Maxwell have
never tried to give a direct and general def-
inition of entropy in mechanical terms. It
was left to Boltzmann to accomplish this step,
starting from the kinetic theory of gases and
defining entropy in a general and universal
fashion as the logarithm of the probability
of the mechanical state. .... To [this defini-
tion] of entropy there correponds a definition
of temperature through dQ = TdS.” [30, p.
151]
One might wonder: why is this new definition, in
terms of entropy, any kind of advance over the “kinetic”
definition of temperature, which is also “purely micro-
physical”? The answer is that it is even more fundamen-
tal. The statistical definition explains the fact reported
in the kinetic definition of temperature: for example, for
an ideal monatomic gas of N particles, the number of
distinct microstates associated with the total energy be-
ing E is proportional to E3N/2. (For particles of mass




i = E. But
then, in the 3N dimensional velocity space, the energy
surface is a sphere of radius R =
√
2E/m whose “sur-
face area” – proportional to the coarse-grained number
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g of distinct microstates consistent with the energy con-
straint – is A ∼ g ∼ R3N−1 ∼ E(3N−1)/2 ≈ E3N/2 since,
for macroscopic systems, N ≈ 1023  1.) Thus, plugging
into Equation (9), we have that
S(E) = kB log(E3N/2) + const (12)







which is, for the assumed kind of system, precisely equiv-
alent to Equation (1).
The statistical definition of temperature also allows a
very fundamental explanation of the various empirical
principles pertaining to temperature, such as that objects
in thermal contact will eventually reach an equilibrium in
which their temperatures are the same. Very briefly, two
systems which can exchange energy will, with overwhelm-
ing probability, end up in a state which maximizes the
total entropy of the joint system. But it is easy to show
that the partitioning of energy which achieves this is pre-
cisely the one for which the “marginal entropies” dS/dE
of each sub-system (associated with further energy ex-
changes) are equal. This then entails, by Equation (11),
that the temperatures will be equal.
Furthermore, the statistical definition of temperature
also expands the domain of physical systems to which
the concept of temperature can be meaningfully applied.
Most famously – and most importantly for the devel-
opment of physics in the 20th century – Boltzmann’s
account of entropy can be extended to electromagnetic
fields (“cavity radiation”), as first undertaken by Max
Planck. This allows the temperature of the electromag-
netic field in a given region to be defined, according to
Equation (11). As is well known, this was precisely the
route by which Planck first stumbled upon the correct
mathematical formula for the spectrum of cavity radia-
tion, which subsequently triggered the creation of quan-
tum theory in the hands of Einstein and others.
IV. DISCUSSION
Let me begin here with an essentialized summary of
the case history sketched in the previous section. The
concept of “temperature” was first formed in the 17th
century, as it was recognized that there existed a phys-
ical property of objects, which could be registered by a
certain (then) new kind of device (the thermometer), and
which was the predominant – but not exclusive – contrib-
utor to the sensations of “hot” and “cold”. I have insisted
that the concept “temperature” is not merely a quantifi-
cation of the degrees of perceptible hot and cold, but
involves also the differentiation of temperature from re-
lated factors, including especially “heat” and subsidiary
properties such as thermal mass and thermal conductiv-
ity, as well as other properties of objects such as surface
texture and size.
This (rather extensive) body of knowledge which is
pre-requisite for the concept “temperature” is summa-
rized (though certainly not exhausted) by what I have
called the thermometric-stage definition of temperature:
temperature is the physical property, primarily but not
exclusively responsible for perceptible degrees of heat,
which can be measured using a thermometer.
I then sketched two major developments in thermody-
namic theory which vastly increased the depth of under-
standing of temperature, and allowed for new definitions
in terms of deeper fundamentals. The first such develop-
ment was the discovery of the underlying micro-physical
basis of temperature (or, here equivalently, heat): the
so-called kinetic theory of heat. The associated kinetic-
stage definition of temperature reads: temperature is the
physical property (of a macroscopic body) which mea-
sures the average translational kinetic energy of its mi-
croscopic constituents.
The transition from the thermometric to the kinetic
stage was lengthy and controversial, involving an ex-
tended period when many or most practicing scientists
(at least tentatively) endorsed the now-discredited caloric
theory of heat. During this controversy, there was, how-
ever, never any question about the meaning of “temper-
ature” or its validity as a concept. Even in the midst of
the controversy, for example, proponents of the different
theories would have agreed about what the temperatures
of various concrete objects were and how that is to be
determined. What they disagreed about was only the un-
derlying microscopic nature of thermal phenomena. So
this debate could rage and, eventually, be settled without
the concept “temperature” in any sense hanging in the
balance; indeed, the stable existence of the concept “tem-
perature” is in a way what made the controversy possible
(in the sense that what the controversy was about was the
underlying microscopic basis of temperature), and also
what made it into a controversy (in the sense that, had
the proponents of the two theories meant radically differ-
ent or incommensurable things by “temperature”, they
wouldn’t have actually been disagreeing about anything).
Thus, in the transition from the thermometric to the ki-
netic stage, we have an example of profound (and indeed
rather messy) “theory change” in which the temperature
concept plays a central role and during which it is re-
defined, but with the concept itself being a central pillar
of stability on which, so to speak, the change occurs.
What makes the concept “temperature” so remarkable
is that there is also a second such change in the transition
from the kinetic to the statistical stage. This involves the
sorting-out of the microscopic basis of “entropy” (much
as the establishment of the kinetic stage involved the
sorting-out of the microscopic basis of “temperature” it-
self), concluding with Boltzmann’s account of entropy
and the associated fundamental statistical-mechanical
definition of temperature: temperature as the quantity
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of additional energy needed (at constant volume) to in-
crease a system’s entropy by one unit (T = dE/dS).
One of the interesting points here is that the statistical
view of temperature allowed, for the first time, the appli-
cation of the concept to a whole new class of entities (for
which the definition in terms of molecular kinetic ener-
gies would be meaningless).4 This is not a change in the
extension of the “temperature” concept, but rather only
an expansion of the class of objects now known to possess
the same physical property that one recognized from the
very beginning as5 measurable with a thermometer.
The main point to be stressed about these develop-
ments is that both of them (that is, the development
from the thermometric to the kinetic stage and then the
development from the kinetic to the statistical stage) are
strong candidates for episodes in which scientific knowl-
edge genuinely and substantially accumulates but with-
out anything like a Kuhnian paradigm shift. In partic-
ular, at the end of each transition, the knowledge inte-
grated by the concept in the earlier stage – and in partic-
ular, the characteristics cited in the definition associated
with that earlier stage – are still endorsed as true. Thus,
after one adopts the kinetic theory of heat, one still rec-
ognizes as true the claim that temperature is a physical
property (associated with perceptible degrees of warmth)
which can be measured by a thermometer. Indeed, as I
have pointed out, not only is the claim that tempera-
ture can be measured by a thermometer consistent with
the claim that temperature is a measure of the average
microscopic motion of an object’s molecules – the latter
actually provides a causal explanation of the former.
And similarly, after one adopts the statistical view of
temperature, one still endorses as true the idea that the
4 Actually, one might question “for the first time” on the grounds
that, in principle, an ordinary thermometer could register the
temperature of a “vacuum” – i.e., a region containing no matter,
but only electromagnetic fields – and so render the attribution
of a particular temperature to that region perfectly meaningful.
Dealing with this in a serious way would involve too much of a
tangent; I simply remark that, in practice, it is very difficult to do
this, and so, in actual history, one does not find people attribut-
ing temperatures to high vacuum regions prior to the 20th cen-
tury. For example, an 1892 “dictionary of universal knowledge”
contains the following discussion: “Guesses have been made from
time to time as to the temperature of space, Pouillet, for exam-
ple, putting it at −238◦F. and Fourier at −58◦. From our present
physical outlook, however, the phrase ‘temperature of space’ is
meaningless. Only where matter is can a true temperature exist.
A thermometer placed in space will receive radiations from all
sides, and the temperature indicated will depend on the power
it has to transform these radiations into the irregular motions
which constitute heat in a body. An ideal thermometer, trans-
parent to all radiations, and capable only of receiving heat by
contact with other bodies, would remain unaffected if isolated
in space.” [31] Thus, while it was recognized that heat could
be communicated from one body to another by means of radia-
tion, the radiation field itself was not yet recognized as a physical
system capable of possessing, itself, a temperature.
5 in principle (see the previous footnote)
temperature of a material system is proportional to the
average translational kinetic energy of its molecular con-
stituents. Indeed, armed with Boltzmann’s account of
the microscopic meaning of entropy, the statistical def-
inition of temperature explains why the temperature is,
for the case of a system composed of molecules, a measure
of their average translational kinetic energy.
The history of the concept “temperature” thus seems
very helpful in responding to the charges of those, like
Kuhn and Feyerabend, who claim in effect that every
profound theoretical development radically changes the
meaning of the involved concepts. Here we seem to have
a case (or actually two cases) of just such profound de-
velopments in which there is apparently no element of
“revolution” at all – and certainly nothing like the al-
leged conceptual incommensurability.
But this now raises some questions. Feyerabend, for
example, also examined the history of the concept “tem-
perature” and came to rather different conclusions from
mine here. What gives?
Feyerabend compares, in particular, the notion of tem-
perature as defined through Kelvin’s absolute tempera-
ture scale in the context of classical (phenomenological)
thermodynamics, with the notion of temperature associ-
ated with the statistical approach to entropy and the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics. He then points out that the
first version of “temperature” (together with the unique-
ness of the Carnot function mentioned above) implies
the strict, universal validity of the second law of thermo-
dynamics: heat will always and exclusively flow from a
hotter body to a colder one. Whereas:
“The statistical account ... allows for fluctu-
ations of heat back and forth between two
levels of temperature and, therefore, again
contradicts one of the laws implicit in the
... thermodynamic temperature. The rela-
tion between the thermodynamic concept of
temperature and what can be defined in the
kinetic theory, therefore, can be seen to con-
form to the pattern that has been described
at the beginning of the present section: we
are again dealing with two incommensurable
concepts.” [2, p. 78]
One curious thing about Feyerabend’s argument is that
the contradictoriness he emphasizes pertains, it seems,
less to the concept “temperature” itself, and more to the
validity (strictly universal vs. merely typical for macro-
scopic systems) of the 2nd law of thermodynamics.
There may be some very isolated and marginal “revolu-
tionary” element when it is recognized that the 2nd law
has only a statistical validity. That is: there is a gen-
uine contradiction between the belief that spontaneous
entropy decreases for closed systems are strictly and ab-
solutely prohibited, and the belief that they can and will
sometimes occur. Whether people actually believed the
2nd law in this absolute sense is perhaps a historical ques-
tion of some interest. Whether they should have so held
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it is, I think, an epistemological question of consider-
able interest. But, here, my point is just that even if
one grants for the sake of argument that people did –
and that they should have – held the 2nd law to have
this strict and universal character, Feyerabend’s claim
that the two temperature concepts are contradictory or
incommensurable still makes no sense. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely the classical thermodynamic notion of temperature
that is meant when one says that, according to the sta-
tistical mechanical viewpoint, it is possible (though ex-
ceedingly rare for macroscopic systems) for heat to flow
spontaneously from a cooler body to a warmer one. The
stability – the “meaning invariance” – of the temperature
concept seems to be presupposed in the very act of noting
the (alleged) contradiction between the two formulations
of the 2nd law.
The reason Feyerabend perceives conceptual incom-
mensurability in this kind of case emerges right away:
“It is certainly possible to redefine the word
‘temperature’ so that it becomes synonymous
with ‘mean kinetic energy.’ But it is equally
certain that on this redefined usage the word
has a different meaning from the one associ-
ated with it in the classical science of heat...”
[2, p. 79]
As has been pointed out before (see, e.g, p. 55 of Ref.
[3]) Feyerabend here simply takes for granted that the
meaning of a concept is its definition. It then follows as
a matter of course that theory change, perhaps resulting
in a new definition, yields a concept with a new meaning
– and one which is therefore fundamentally different from
the original concept.
The identification of the concept’s meaning with its
definition thus leads to a conclusion which, in light of the
above case-study, seems absurd: it’s just obvious, for ex-
ample, that Joseph Black (in the mid-18th century) and
Max Planck (in the early 20th century) meant the same
thing by “temperature” (even if the latter knew consid-
erably more about the relevant phenomena than the for-
mer). What the case-study then suggests is the adoption
of a different account of the meaning of a concept. In
particular, what seems to be needed is a theory in which
the concept means all of the characteristics of the refer-
ents – or more precisely, in which a concept means the
referents themselves. Such a view was suggested already
by Shapere, and developed more thoroughly by Hilary
Putnam. [4] It is on the basis of such a view of meaning
(explicitly acknowledged or not) that many commenta-
tors have denied the charges of conceptual incommensu-
rability across episodes of theory change. [4–7]
From one point of view, this is all that’s needed. A
concept doesn’t simply consist in and doesn’t simply
mean its definition, or some other condensed descrip-
tion (or statement of necessary and sufficient condiditions
for class inclusion). The concept functions, rather, as a
storehouse for collecting and organizing knowledge about
a certain class of existents, and its meaning is those ex-
istents, including not only all of the already-established
knowledge about them that is integrated by the concept,
but also (by deliberate intention) facts about the refer-
ents which are not yet known. Then, in at least many
cases in which some profound new discovery is made
about the nature of the referents of a concept, and even in
cases in which the concept’s definition is updated in light
of such new discoveries, it becomes possible to say that,
nevertheless, the meaning of the concept – and indeed
the concept itself – has not changed.
From another point of view, though, this answer alone
is insufficient and not even very helpful. Yes, a concept
means (at least in part) its referents. But the question
is: how, precisely, does one in fact pick out a class of ex-
istents such that the class will (normally) remain stable
– i.e., such that the associated concept will (normally)
retain its meaning – even as knowledge continues to ex-
pand in the future? Putnam’s account of reference (an
extension, to concepts, of Kripke’s account of the refer-
ence of proper names) doesn’t help much here. Indeed,
Putnam essentially dismisses – at least from the purview
of philosophy – the very question: “Since, in many cases,
extension is determined socially and not individually, ow-
ing to the division of linguistic labor, I believe that this
problem is properly a problem for sociolinguistics.” [4]
At the end of the day, the process by which, according
to Putnam, one forms a concept amounts to pointing at
some concrete object (ostention) and declaring: “by ‘X’
I mean this and everything like it.”
But: like it in what respect? Here Putnam retreats to
what amounts to traditional moderate realism or essen-
tialism. To use his own famous example, the meaning of
“water” is ultimately: anything sharing the same micro-
structural essence as whichever bits of water were pointed
to at the initial “dubbing”. Thus, if it is later discovered
that there is a substance sharing all of the “surface prop-
erties” of water (e.g., it is clear, potable, sometimes falls
from clouds, etc.) it is nevertheless not water if its molec-
ular structure turns out to be XY Z instead of H2O. The
point here is that, for Putnam, the knowledge one pos-
sesses initially about the referents of a concept – that is,
the knowledge on the basis of which one first forms the
concept – is actually irrelevant to the concept’s meaning,
i.e., to the determination of the precise class of existents
to which the concept refers.6
6 Some further asides about moderate realism and the issues of
this paper are appropriate here. First, one of the interesting and
important aspects of the concept “temperature” is that it is a
concept for an attribute or property, not for a kind of entity.
So it is prima facie implausible that the metaphysics of “nat-
ural kinds” – which is often deployed by or at least suggested
by the defenders of the stability of conceptual reference across
episodes of theory change, could apply in this case. But the kinds
of issues (pertaining to the growth and development of science)
that have motivated the deployment of this metaphysics for this
kind of problem, are equally present for the case of “tempera-
ture” as in the more-commonly-discussed cases of concepts for
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There is, then, a kind of underlying agreement between
Putnam and Feyerabend. Arabatzis has nicely summa-
rized Feyerabend (and Kuhn) as promoting “a contex-
tual view of concepts, according to which concepts obtain
their meaning from the theoretical framework in which
they are embedded. It follows that when a theoretical
framework changes the concepts embedded in it change
too.” [6] Putnam, as if conceding the premise that any
role played by a background knowledge context renders
the concept subjective7 , provides an account of refer-
ence in which context plays no role at all – indeed, in
which reference is determined by characteristics of which
one was wholly unaware when the concept was initially
formed.
The problem is, both views seem totally implausible as
accounts of the formation and development of the con-
cept “temperature” (which, I want to suggest, is typical).
Previously-established background knowledge (e.g., that
some things are hot and some are cold, that there is a
kind of spectrum of degrees of warmth, that generally
speaking cooler things warm up if placed near a hot-
ter thing and vice versa, that for the most part things
placed in contact with each other or with the same third
thing will after some time attain roughly the same de-
gree of warmth, but that there are puzzling exceptions
to this, that air expands slightly when heated and con-
tracts slightly when cooled, etc.) played an ineliminable
role in the formation of the concept “temperature.” The
actual concept-formation process is very different from
(typically theoretical) entities. This of course suggests that the
retreat to moderate realism is the wrong strategy even for the
cases of concepts for (alleged) “natural kinds.” On the other
hand, endorsing such an approach and attempting to apply it to
the case of “temperature” would leave one in a quandry, for there
are not one but two theoretical developments which could quite
plausibly be cited as the discovery of the true, micro-structural
“essence” which legitimizes (and constitutes the real referent of)
the concept. That is, which is going to be the analogy, for “tem-
perature”, of the discovery that water is essentially H2O? That
temperature is a measure of average molecular translational ki-
netic energy? Or that temperature is a measure of the amount of
additional energy required (at constant volume) to increase the
entropy by one unit? Both answers seem equally compelling, yet
the proposed account would seem to require that one be privi-
leged. This of course is a second way in which the concept “tem-
perature” suggests against the (general) applicability of moder-
ate realism. More positively, the case-study strongly suggests
that the felt qualitative difference between knowing (say) that
water is cool, clear, and potable – and knowing that water is
H2O – is illusory. In moving from the earlier stage to the later
stage, one is not achieving, for the first time, a grasp of the sin-
gle, true, final metaphysical “essence” of water. One is grasping
a causally deeper distinguishing characteristic, to be sure. But
this is a movement along a continuous and open-ended path, not
a discrete step from the absence of a certain kind of knowledge
to its presence.
7 See here pp. 42-3 of Ref. [8] where Rand writes: “Concepts are
not and cannot be formed in a vacuum; they are formed in a
context.... [But t]his does not mean that conceptualization is a
subjective process...”
the sort of ostensive dubbing event that Putnam seems
to have in mind. (Indeed, picking off a physical prop-
erty (like temperature) ostensively seems inconceivable
in principle: you can’t point to “a temperature” or a
mass or an electric charge or ...)
But contra Feyerabend, the background context of
knowledge in which the “temperature” concept is born
does not get in the way of the concept’s having a sta-
ble, rigid meaning. For one thing, none of the relevant
background beliefs (sketched in parentheses in the pre-
vious paragraph) are overturned by later developments
(even if one allows the temporary wide acceptance of the
caloric theory of heat as a “development”). This is the
meaning of the claim that the later stages of development
of the concept “temperature” illustrate cumulativity, not
revolution. And anyway, it just seems completely clear
that even, for example, in the 20th century – hundreds
of years after the concept was originally formed – physi-
cists who talk (say) about the temperature of the cosmic
microwave background radiation, or attribute negative
absolute temperatures to certain unusual kinds of sys-
tems, mean exactly the same thing, by “temperature”,
that people meant in the 17th century.
To summarize this discussion about the meaning and
reference of concepts, it seems that what’s needed is an
account of concepts in which the stability of their refer-
ence obtains, not in spite of their arising in a context,
but rather by means of their arising in a context8 – in
particular, by means of the specific knowledge in that
context on the basis of which a certain class of existents
is integrated in contrast to others from which its mem-
bers differ.
By way of closing, let me simply list some features that
I think a viable account of concepts would need to have
in order to comply with and illuminate the features of the
development of “temperature” which I have highlighted
and which I consider to be typical of concepts in general.
The theory must
• reject the discovery/justification dichotomy and lo-
cate the justificatory basis of concepts in the pro-
cess of concept-formation (which will have to be
emphasized and explained);
• respect and explain the hierarchical structure of
knowledge in general and concepts in particular and
thereby clarify how concepts can arise in a context
without that implying Feyerabendian incommensu-
rability or a failure of “meaning invariance”;
• regard concepts as storehouses for collecting and
organizing knowledge (about a certain class of exis-
tents) which storehouses are constructed, from the
beginning, to be addition-friendly [8, p. 66-7] on
the premise that knowledge is an ever-expanding
sum;
8 Cf. pp. 78-82 of Ref. [8].
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• treat concepts as meaning their referents, with def-
initions treated not as exhaustive stipulations of
meaning, but rather as condensations [8, p. 48] of
what is known about the referents in a given con-
text of knowledge.
Such a theory will inevitably support the perspective
on the historical development of “temperature” that has
been sketched above. The further conjecture, then, is
that such a theory will also help us to see the degree to
which the “temperature” concept is normal, i.e., indica-
tive of the pattern of development of scientific concepts
as such, and (thus) indicative also of the pattern of de-
velopment of knowledge generally.
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